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Mind Wandering
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University College London
Attention may be distracted from its intended focus both by stimuli in the external environment and by
internally generated task-unrelated thoughts during mind wandering. However, previous attention re-
search has focused almost exclusively on distraction by external stimuli, and the extent to which mind
wandering relates to external distraction is as yet unclear. In the present study, the authors examined the
relationship between individual differences in mind wandering and in the magnitude of distraction by
either response-competing distractors or salient response-unrelated and task-irrelevant distractors. Self-
reported susceptibility to mind wandering was found to positively correlate with task-irrelevant distrac-
tion but not with response-competition interference. These results reveal mind wandering as a manifes-
tation of susceptibility to task-irrelevant distraction and establish a laboratory measure of general
susceptibility to irrelevant distraction, including both internal and external sources.
Keywords: mind wandering, task-unrelated thoughts, attention, response-competition, distractibility
Efficient task performance requires that attention be focused
exclusively on information relevant to the task while task-
irrelevant distracters are ignored. However, failures to ignore ir-
relevant distractors abound, and much attention research has been
devoted to measuring distraction and delineating its critical deter-
minants (e.g., Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974;
Lavie, 1995; Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004).
This research has almost exclusively focused on cases of dis-
traction by extraneous external stimuli presented during the task
performance (e.g., the presence of a response-competing distrac-
tor—e.g., see Lavie, 1995—or one that has a unique visual or
auditory feature; Dalton & Lavie, 2004; Theeuwes, 1992). In daily
life, however, people may often find their attention being dis-
tracted from its intended focus on their task by their own thoughts
when their mind wanders off the task and onto some task-unrelated
topic. For instance, readers of this article may find their thoughts
drifting off at some points (perhaps during the Method section)
into other directions (e.g., an interesting issue they have heard
about in the morning news).
Such mind wandering can be a particularly potent internal
source of distraction and produce frustrating impediments to task
performance. Nevertheless, despite an increasing interest in the
study of mind wandering (e.g., see Kane & McVay, 2012; McVay
& Kane, 2010; Smallwood, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006),
this growing literature has remained largely separate from main-
stream study of selective attention and distraction. Thus, previous
research has not as yet established mind wandering as another
manifestation of an individual’s vulnerability to distraction. Our
aim in the present study was therefore to examine and establish the
relationship between mind wandering and external distraction. We
reasoned that if mind wandering propensity is, at least in part,
driven by an overall vulnerability to irrelevant distraction, then
individual differences in mind wandering should be associated
with individual differences in other measures of distraction (by
external stimuli).
Because of its highly subjective nature, measures of mind wan-
dering typically rely on subjective reports (see Smallwood &
Schooler, 2006, for a review). Our second aim in this study was
therefore to examine whether mind wandering propensity can be
predicted from behavioral performance measures of distraction.
Existing measures of mind wandering typically use either inter-
mittent thought probes during a task or questionnaires. These two
types of mind wandering reporting have been consistently found to
correlate with each other and to relate in the same manner to other
variables (e.g., Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003;
Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood, Heim, Riby, & Davies, 2006).
In the present study, the questionnaire approach was most appro-
priate for two reasons: We wished to assess the general tendency
to mind wander rather than the specific tendency for mind wan-
dering during the particular task used. Most important, we wished
to avoid any confounding effect of the thought probes themselves
on our behavioral index of external distraction and vice versa any
effects of the distractors we have used on mind wandering.
To assess the propensity to mind wander, we therefore used the
Daydreaming Frequency subscale (DFS) of the Imaginal Processes
Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1970). This is the best established
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questionnaire measure of individual differences in propensity to
mind wander. Moreover, it is exclusively focused on mind wan-
dering rather than other types of attention failure, and thus any
correlation between this measure and external distraction can be
attributed specifically to mind wandering. The DFS and has been
shown to have good internal consistency, test–retest reliability, and
concurrent validity (Tanaka & Huba, 1985–1986). Scores on this
test were found to correlate with other self-report measures of
mind wandering such as diary keeping (Gold, Teague, & Jarvinen,
1981) and thought probing (Hurlbert, 1980). Scores on the DFS
have also recently been shown to correlate with the increased
neural activity in regions of the default network, suggested to be
associated with task-unrelated thought, when performing practiced
tasks (during which participants had previously been shown to
report more task-unrelated thought) compared with novel tasks
(Mason et al., 2007).
To measure distractibility, we used the response-competition
paradigm, a well-established and widely used index of distraction
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Forster & Lavie, 2007; Lavie, 1995).
Participants made speeded forced-choice responses to one of two
target letters (X or N) while attempting to ignore a distractor letter
that was either response-congruent (e.g., distractor X for target X)
or response-incongruent (e.g., distractor N for the target X) pre-
sented in the periphery on 80% of trials. As is standard in this
paradigm, distractor interference was calculated by subtracting the
mean reaction time (RT) to trials with response-congruent distractors
from the mean RT to trials with response-incongruent distractors.
The distractor interference measured in the response-
competition paradigm might differ, however, from interference
from task-unrelated thoughts in one potentially important respect.
Far from being task unrelated, the distractors in the response-
competition paradigm are closely task-related: having the same
identity as the response targets. We therefore also included a
recently established (Forster & Lavie, 2008a, 2008b) measure of
vulnerability to task-irrelevant distractions, presenting a salient and
meaningful distractor image (e.g., of Superman) in the periphery on a
minority of the trials (10%). Within this paradigm, distractor
interference from the task-irrelevant stimuli is calculated as the
mean RT in the distractor present trials minus the mean RT in the
no-distractor trials.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Ninety-four undergraduate psychology students
(21 men), between 18 and 47 years of age (M  20 years old),
participated in Experiment 1. Two participants had very low ac-
curacy in incongruent trials (25%), which, coupled with their
high accuracy on congruent trials (85%), suggested misunder-
standing of task instructions (i.e., they had responded to the dis-
tractor rather than the target). The data of these two participants
were therefore excluded from all analyses.
Stimuli and procedure. All stimuli in all experiments were
presented using E-Prime on a computer with a 15-in. monitor at a
viewing distance of 57 cm. Participants were presented with an
attention task followed by the 12-item DFS of the Imaginal Pro-
cesses Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1970). In each trial of the
attention task, participants were presented with a centrally pre-
sented fixation point (500 ms), followed immediately by a stimulus
display (100 ms) consisting of a target letter (either X or N,
subtending 0.6°  0.4°) arranged with five small nontarget Os
(0.15°  0.12°) in a circular formation (1.6° radius) around fixa-
tion. The targets and nontargets were presented in gray (with the
RGB values 160, 160, 160) on a black background. Participants
were instructed to search this display for the target letter, ignoring
any stimuli that did not appear as part of the circular search array,
and to press the 0 key for an X and the 2 key for an N as fast as
possible while being accurate.
On the first three trials of every block (these three trials were
intended as warm-up trials and were excluded from all analyses)
and 10% of the remaining 60 trials in each block, this circular
search array was presented alone. This was the no-distractor con-
dition, and all combinations of target position and target identity
were fully counterbalanced on these trials. On 80% of the trials
(excluding the first three trials in each block), a light gray (with the
RGB values 200, 200, 200) response-competition distractor (either an
X or an N, 0.8° 0.5°) was presented to either the left or the right of
the circular search array, 1.4° from the nearest circle letter. All
combinations of distractor–target compatibility, target identity, target
location, and distractor location were fully counterbalanced for these
trials.
On the remaining 10% of trials (excluding the first three trials of
each block), a task-irrelevant cartoon character distractor (Superman,
Spiderman, Pikachu, SpongeBob SquarePants, Mickey Mouse, or
Donald Duck), subtending 2.8° to 4° vertically  2.8° to 3.2° hori-
zontally, was presented above or below the circular search array (with
its center 4.6° from fixation and between 6° and 10° edge to edge
from the nearest circle letter). The task-irrelevant distractors remained
onscreen until response. For these trials, all combinations of distractor
position, target position, and target identity were fully counterbal-
anced, and each specific distractor was equally likely to appear with
each combination of target identity and target position. A 90-ms beep
was sounded on incorrect responses or if the participant failed to
respond within the 2,000-ms time limit.
Participants who did not achieve 65% accuracy during the two
practice blocks repeated the practice blocks. After the practice
blocks, participants performed four blocks of 63 trials of the
attention task before finally completing a computerized version of
the DFS of the Imaginal Processes Inventory.
To test for the possibility that participants might vary in their
level of familiarity with the cartoon distractor images we used or
in their level of interest in each of these images (factors that could
potentially influence the likelihood of distraction), the majority
(n  45) of the participants also completed a follow-up session
approximately one year following the first session. In this session,
they provided ratings of each image on 8-point scales for famil-
iarity, interest, stimulation, and meaningfulness. Participants were
also asked to fixate on each distractor image for 1 min and then
indicate on a 7-point scale whether they had few or many thoughts
about the cartoon picture or (on another 7-point scale) about things
unrelated to the cartoon picture.
Results and Discussion
In all experiments, RT analyses were performed on correct
responses only. Table 1 presents the results for the two behavioral
measures of distraction. As can be seen in the table, the task
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2 FORSTER AND LAVIE
provided a sensitive measure of distraction. Robust interference
effects on task RT were found from both the irrelevant distractors,
t(91)  7.12, standard error of the mean (SEM)  6.69, p  .001,
for the increase in mean RT on irrelevant distractor versus no-
distractor trials and the response competing distractors, t(91) 
11.42, SEM  4.00, p  .001, for the increase in RT on response-
incongruent versus response-congruent distractor trials. There was
no correlation between the two measures of distractor interference,
Pearson r(92)  .041, p  .701 (two-tailed as in the rest of the
statistical reports).
Mind wandering scores ranged between 19 and 58 (M  39).
Figure 1 plots mind wandering scores as a function of individual
differences in the magnitude of the irrelevant distractor interfer-
ence effects.1 As shown in the figure, there was a positive corre-
lation between the mind wandering scores and irrelevant distractor
interference effects, Pearson r(92)  .262, p  .012; higher mind
wandering scores were associated with greater interference from
the irrelevant distractors. No relationship was found between mind
wandering and irrelevant distractor effects on errors (p  .8).
Our follow-up session results indicated that mind wandering
scores were not associated with the ratings of the stimulation,
familiarity, interest, or meaningfulness of the cartoon images, nor
were they associated with the extent to which participants reported
thoughts about the cartoon images during the follow-up session
(all r values  .1, all p values  .5, with the exception of
familiarity, for which r.13, p .38). The reduced sample size
in the follow-up session necessitates particular caution in inter-
preting these null effects.2 However, the lack of any statistical
trends approaching significance makes it unlikely that a larger data
set would have revealed evidence supporting an alternative ac-
count of the correlation between mind wandering and irrelevant
distraction simply in terms of differences in individual response to
the cartoon stimuli.
However, our follow-up data set did reveal positive correlations
between cartoon-unrelated (i.e., task-unrelated) thoughts and both
the magnitude of irrelevant distractor effects in the first session,
r(45)  .302, p  .044, and mind wandering scores, r(45)  .381,
p .010. In other words, even when asked to fixate on the cartoon
distractor images, participants with wandering minds were more
likely to produce thoughts unrelated to these. These findings
replicate and extend our finding of the relationship between mind
wandering and task-irrelevant external distraction using an online
measure of mind wandering. Such replication further supports our
proposal of a relationship between mind wandering and external
distraction, while making alternative accounts in terms of
questionnaire-related issues (e.g., reporting biases) appear un-
likely.
In contrast to the pattern found in relation to the irrelevant
distractors, response-competition effects were not positively re-
lated to mind wandering: In fact, the (nonsignificant) trend was for
a negative correlation, r(92)  .133, p  .20. A similar nonsig-
nificant trend was found in relation to response-competition effects
on errors, r(92).194, p .063. Thus, the relationship between
mind wandering and external distraction does not appear to extend
to response-competition interference. Indeed, we have previously
found that although perceptual load, a well-established determi-
nant of attention, can modulate both mind wandering and
response-competition effects (and while individual differences in
the magnitude of perceptual load effect on one measure correlate
with those on the other measure; Forster & Lavie, 2009, Experi-
ment 4), the two measures do not correlate with each other,
r(20)  .024, p  .90.
Our present findings that the two external distraction measures
did not correlate with each other and that only irrelevant distrac-
tion correlates with mind wandering suggest two distinct forms of
distraction depending on whether the source is task relevant or
irrelevant. However, although we suggest task relevance is the
critical factor, we note that our two measures (response-
competition and irrelevant distraction) also differed in terms of
several other factors such as visual salience, frequency of presen-
tation, and semantic meaning (see footnote 2). We return to the
dissociation between these different forms of distraction further in
Experiment 3, which directly addresses the role of task relevance
while controlling for other differences. However, we first focus on
1 Note that even after excluding the participant with the highest irrele-
vant distractor interference effect, our correlation remains significant at
r(91)  .198, p  .03, one-tailed.
2 Within this reduced sample, Experiment 1’s correlation between irrel-
evant distractor interference and mind wandering is reduced to marginal
significance, r(45)  .227, p  .067, one-tailed.
Table 1
Mean Reaction Times (in Milliseconds) and Error Rate Percentage as a Function of Distractor
Condition in Experiments 1–3
Variable
Distractor condition
I C I  C ID ND ID  ND
Experiment 1
RT (SE) 623 (10) 577 (8.43) 46 615 (10) 567 (9.28) 48
% error 17 11 13 11
Experiment 2
RT (SE) 516 (20) 481 (15) 35
% error 10 14
Experiment 3
RT (SE) 806 (24) 708 (17) 98 789 (18) 685 (16) 104
% error 16 7 14 10
Note. RT  reaction time; I  response-incongruent distractor; C  response-congruent distractor; ID 
irrelevant distractor; ND  no distractor.
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3MIND WANDERING AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DISTRACTION
further characterizing the positive association between mind wan-
dering and our irrelevant distraction measure.
Experiment 2
The correlation between mind wandering and task-irrelevant
external distraction in Experiment 1 appears to support our hy-
pothesis that mind wandering propensity is driven by overall
differences in susceptibility to irrelevant distraction. However, it
remains possible that the increased mind wandering reported by
the more distracted individuals could instead reflect an effect of
the irrelevant distractors on mind wandering. For example, the
meaningful distractor cartoons may have triggered associations not
just directly related to the cartoon images themselves but also
related to other topics that could stimulate mind wandering (e.g., a
current ongoing goal or concern; e.g., Klinger, 1971, 2009; Small-
wood & Schooler, 2006). For example, the Spider-Man image
might trigger mind wandering about personally relevant concerns
or goals relating to the friend with whom one saw the Spider-Man
movie (e.g., “I must remember to call him tonight”). Such mind
wandering during the task could explain the results of Experiment
1 if it led participants to overestimate their general susceptibility to
mind wandering in the questionnaire report following the experi-
ment.
To examine this account, in Experiment 2, we incorporated
intermittent thought probes into our paradigm, thus allowing com-
parison of levels of mind wandering versus external distraction
during task performance. To assess effects of distractor presenta-
tion on participant thoughts, we varied whether thought probes
were presented immediately following a distractor or following
five or more consecutive no-distractor trials.
If our results are explained by a direct effect of the distractor
cartoons, then a greater rate of task-unrelated thought should be
found immediately after a distractor compared with after several
trials without any distractors. In contrast, our hypothesis that mind
wandering and irrelevant external distraction are linked via the
same trait (of general susceptibility to irrelevant distraction) does
not lead to any prediction regarding the effects of distractor pres-
ence on mind wandering.
To test our hypothesis further, we also increased the number of
task blocks, allowing us to examine variation in both variables as
a function of time on task. Mind wandering is typically found to
increase with time on task (e.g., Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Reid,
2003; Teasdale et al., 1995). Conversely, irrelevant distractor
effects might be expected to get smaller over time because of
increased habituation to the distractor (e.g., Forster & Lavie,
2008a). Such a contrasting pattern would also serve to rule out an
alternative account in terms of a task-specific relationship between
the irrelevant distractor and mind wandering.
Method
Participants. Fourteen new participants (seven men), be-
tween the ages of 19–35 years (M  24.5 years) participated in
Experiment 2. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Stimuli and procedure. Participants performed a computer-
ized task similar to that used in Experiment 1, with the following
exceptions. No response-competition distractors were presented,
so the composition of trials was 10% irrelevant distractor present
and 90% no distractor present. At the end of each block, partici-
pants were presented with a thought probe consisting of the on-
screen question, “What were you thinking just now?” Onscreen
instructions prompted participants to make button-press responses
indicating whether their thoughts at the time of the probe were
either about the letter search task, related to the cartoon images, or
unrelated to either task or distractor stimuli. Participants were
given definitions and examples of all three categories of thoughts
prior to participation. They were instructed to respond to the
thought probes in their own time and not prepare for them in any
way during the task block (e.g., by keeping fingers on the response
keys).
Participants performed two practice blocks of 12 trials (each
ending in a practice thought probe) before completing 16 blocks of
the task (each ending in a thought probe). The probes were
presented either immediately after a distractor trial or after a
minimum of five no-distractor trials. Given the low frequency of
distractor trials, to discourage participants from associating dis-
tractor presentation with probes, we presented the majority (10/16)
of probes after no-distractor trials. In addition, to make the ap-
pearance of thought probes less predictable, block length was
varied: Blocks were equally likely to be 20, 40, or 60 trials in
length. Block length was counterbalanced with block type (dis-
tractor before probe, no distractor before probe). The order of
block types was random, with the restriction that both types were
equally represented in the first and second halves of the task.
Results and Discussion
Responses to thought probes. Participants reported task-
unrelated thoughts on 40% (SEM  4.82) of the probes on aver-
age. The rate of thoughts related to the cartoon images (M 16%)
Figure 1. Mind wandering and irrelevant distractor interference in Ex-
periment 1. Mind wandering (score on the Daydreaming Frequency sub-
scale) correlated positively with mean irrelevant distractor cost (mean RT
for distractor trials  mean RT for no-distractor trials, in milliseconds).
RT  reaction time; D  distractor; ND  no distractor.
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4 FORSTER AND LAVIE
was significantly smaller, t(13)  3.85, SEM  5.87, p  .002,
and these were more likely to be reported for a probe following a
distractor (M  29%) versus a probe following five or more
no-distractor trials (M  11%), t(13)  2.57, SEM  6.97, p 
.024. This suggests that on a minority of trials, the presence of the
distractors may have triggered thoughts directly relating to the
content of the cartoon images. It is important to note, however, that
the distractor did not appear to trigger task-unrelated mind wan-
dering: Task-unrelated thoughts were no more likely to be reported
after distractor presentation (M  36%) than after no distractor
(M  42%), t(13)  1.02, SEM  6.30, p  .326.
Effects of time on task. Mean RTs and error rates in Exper-
iment 2 are presented in Table 1. As in Experiment 1, the presence
of an irrelevant distractor produced significant interference relative
to the no-distractor baseline, t(13)  4.62, SEM  7.55, p  .001.
Mean irrelevant distractor RT costs and percentage of task-
unrelated thought reports as a function of time on task can be seen
in Table 2.
To directly compare effects of time on task on internal versus
external distraction, we standardized both variables (into Z scores)
and entered them into a repeated-measures analysis of variance
with the factors of distractor type (internal, external) and time on
task (Blocks 1–8, Blocks 9–16). The analysis of variance revealed
no significant main effect of distractor type, F 1, or time on task,
F(1, 13)  3.05, mean square error (MSE)  1.36, p  .104.
However, there was a significant interaction between time on task
and distractor type, F(1, 13)  7.94, MSE  0.869, p  .015,
reflecting the opposite effects of time on task (see Figure 2):
Whereas interference from irrelevant external distractors was sig-
nificantly reduced with increased time on task (see Table 2),
t(13)  3.34, SEM  10.38, p  .005, the level of task-unrelated
thoughts showed only a weak trend toward increasing (t  1).
Thus, the results of Experiment 2 show no increase in mind
wandering after distractor presentation, and time on task was found
to have differential effects on internal (i.e., task-unrelated mind
wandering) versus external distraction. Therefore, the results of
Experiment 2 do not support the notion of any direct influence of
moment-to-moment fluctuations in one form of distraction on the
other. Rather, the correlation with mind wandering scores appears
to be driven by a more general propensity.
Experiment 3
Having established a positive association between mind wan-
dering and task-irrelevant external distraction that is not driven by
direct effects of irrelevant distraction on mind wandering, we now
examine the second key finding of Experiment 1: Unlike irrelevant
distractor interference, response-competition interference was not
related to mind wandering. This dissociation highlights that mind
wandering is not related to all forms of external distractor inter-
ference. We propose that mind wandering may be specifically
related to task-irrelevant forms of distraction. As mind wandering
is, by definition, the propensity to have task-unrelated thoughts, it
seems plausible that this would be positively linked to distraction
from external stimuli that are also unrelated to the current task. By
contrast, response-competition interference effects are defined on
the basis of the relevance of the distractors to the task response and
reflect not only the ability to ignore distractors but also processes
relating to the specific task–distractor relationship (e.g., response-
conflict resolution; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen,
2001). It is unclear to what extent the latter processes are related
to the general ability to ignore salient yet irrelevant distracters:
Indeed, we note that the two forms of external distraction were not
correlated in Experiment 1. Thus, task relevance may be the
critical factor underlying the contrasting relationships of the two
external distraction measures to mind wandering.
However, before drawing such a conclusion, it was important to
test other accounts for our findings. We note that the two distractor
types in Experiment 1 differed not only in terms of task relevance
but also in terms of salience, novelty (recall that the irrelevant
distractors appeared considerably less frequently than the
response-competition distractors), visual complexity, and semantic
meaningfulness. To rule out the possibility that any of these factors
could alternatively account for our dissociation, we designed Ex-
periment 3 to directly examine the role of task relevance while
keeping these other characteristics constant across distractor type.
Participants performed a task in which cartoon image distractors
were presented either as task-irrelevant distractors (as in Experi-
ment 1) or as task-relevant response-competition characters. Par-
ticipants were asked to classify centrally presented names of
cartoon characters as either a superhero or a Disney character
while ignoring cartoon distractor images, presented on the minor-
ity of trials in the periphery. These were equally likely to be
congruent or incongruent response-competition distractors (se-
lected from images of the six Disney characters and six superhe-
roes whose names were used as target stimuli) or task-irrelevant
Table 2
Mean Reaction Time Distractor Costs (in Milliseconds) and
Percentage of Reported Task-Unrelated Thoughts as a Function
of Time on Task in Experiment 2
Distractor measure Blocks 1–8 Blocks 9–16
Irrelevant distractor cost (SE) 54 (9) 19 (10)
% task-unrelated thought (SE) 39 (6) 41 (6)
Note. Irrelevant distractor cost  mean reaction time with the irrelevant
distractor  mean reaction time with no distractor.
Figure 2. Percentage of task-unrelated thought (TUT) reports and exter-
nal distractor cost (mean reaction time for distractor trials mean reaction
time for no-distractor trials) as a function of time on task. Both measures
are standardized to Z scores. As can be seen, the two types of distractors
show contrasting patterns of variation as a function of time on task.
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5MIND WANDERING AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DISTRACTION
distractors (cartoon characters who were neither Disney nor su-
perhero characters; e.g., Bart Simpson). Each distractor image was
repeated the same number of times to keep the same level of
novelty across the distractor types. By using meaningful, visually
complex cartoon images of equivalent visual salience and novelty
as both task-relevant and task-irrelevant distractors, we sought to
isolate differences in task relevance.
In addition, we sought to establish that the observed relation
between irrelevant distraction and mind wandering was not influ-
enced by differences in awareness of cognitive processes or con-
fidence in cognitive abilities. For example, as a result of the
negative outcomes that tend to be associated with distraction (e.g.,
car accidents, losing work while computing, problems in the
workplace; see Forster & Lavie, 2008a, for brief review), highly
distractible individuals may be more aware of their general vul-
nerability to cognitive failure and thus overestimate their mind
wandering. For this purpose, participants also completed the Meta-
Cognitions Questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997),
which contains subscales measuring cognitive confidence and cog-
nitive self-consciousness. Finally, in Experiment 1, the mind-
wandering questionnaire was always administered after task per-
formance, so the questionnaire response may have been influenced
by the degree of distraction and mind wandering during the task
rather than representing general tendencies. To rule out this pos-
sibility, we administered the questionnaires before the task in
Experiment 3.
Method
Participants. Forty new participants (15 men), 19–28 years
old (M  23 years) participated in Experiment 3. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were able to recog-
nize the cartoon images (this was assessed after their participation
in the experiment).
Stimuli and procedure. Participants first completed the DFS
of the Imaginal Processes Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1970)
before performing the new attention task. In this task, all stimuli
were presented on a black background. In each trial, a 500-ms
presentation of a light gray fixation point was immediately fol-
lowed by the task display, which remained onscreen either until
response or for 2,000 s in the case of no response. The task display
consisted of the name of either a superhero (from the set Super-
man, Spiderman, Hulk, Wolverine, Batman, Robin) or a Disney
character (from the set Mickey, Donald, Pluto, Pooh, Piglet, Tig-
ger) presented with equal likelihood in one of six positions with
the nearest edge either 0.3°, 1.3°, or 2.3° of visual angle above or
below fixation. The names were presented in light gray (RGB 
180, 180, 180), with title case, subtending 0.5° vertically by 0.9°
2.3° horizontally. Participants were instructed to respond by press-
ing the 0 key for a superhero and 2 for a Disney cartoon as fast as
possible while maintaining a high level of accuracy. During the
task instructions, participants were shown a list of the names of the
superheroes and Disney characters and asked to classify them
verbally; all participants were able to do this. A beep was heard if
the participant made an error or failed to respond within the
2,000-ms time window.
On 90% of trials, the cartoon names appeared alone—this was
the no-distractor condition. On 10% of trials, a cartoon image
subtending 3.8°–5°  2.4°–3.8 ° appeared either to the right or to
the left (4.4° from fixation, minimum of 0.7° nearest edge to edge
of target stimuli) of the screen. This distractor image was selected
with equal probability from task-relevant images of the 12 super-
hero or Disney cartoon characters whose names served as target
stimuli and task-irrelevant images of six other cartoon characters
that were neither superheroes nor Disney stimuli: SpongeBob
SquarePants, Hello Kitty, Cartman from the South Park cartoon,
Bart Simpson, an Angry Bird, and Pikachu. The distractor image
was equally likely to be either response-congruent (the same
cartoon character whose name appeared as the target stimulus),
response-incongruent (a cartoon character from the opposite char-
acter to the target stimulus; e.g., an image of the superhero Batman
accompanying the name of the Disney character Piglet), or task
irrelevant or neutral (a cartoon character who was neither super-
hero nor Disney cartoon) in relation to the target name stimuli.
Participants completed a practice block of 12 trials before com-
pleting 12 blocks of 60 trials. The first three trials of each block
were considered warm-up trials and so always had no distractors—
these trials were therefore excluded from analysis. After the atten-
tion task, participants completed the Meta-Cognitions Question-
naire. Finally, to confirm that all participants were familiar with
the cartoon images prior to the experimental session (this was
critical given that the identity of the characters determined their
task relevance), participants were shown images of each cartoon
character distractor and asked to name and provide details of the
character.
Results and Discussion
See Table 1 for mean RTs in each distractor condition. As in
Experiment 1, the two indices of external distraction were calcu-
lated as response-competition effects (incongruent minus congru-
ent) and irrelevant distractor effects (irrelevant distractor minus no
distractor). Once again, the task proved a sensitive measure of
distraction, as both types of distractor produced significant RT
interference: For the response-competition distractor effects,
t(39)  7.67, SEM  12.81, p  .001; for the irrelevant distractor
effects, t(39)  14.94, SEM  6.97, p  .001.
In contrast to Experiment 1, the two forms of distractor inter-
ference were significantly correlated in Experiment 3, r(40) 
.309, p .026. This seems likely to reflect effects of the additional
factors that the two types of external distractor have in common in
Experiment 3 (e.g., visual salience, meaning, novelty).
Critically, the relationship of these measures to mind wandering
replicated the pattern found in Experiment 1. Mind wandering
scores showed a similar range to that in Experiment 1 (22–58, M
40). As in Experiment 1, mind wandering was positively related to
the degree of interference from task-irrelevant distractors: r(40) 
.378, p  .016, see Figure 3. In contrast, mind wandering was not
significantly related to interference from the task-relevant
response-competition distractors, showing only a weak negative
trend: r(40)  .119, p  .465. Mind wandering showed no
relation to either error measures: For irrelevant distraction, p 
.45; for RC effect, r  .185, p  .25. Note that the measures of
cognitive confidence and cognitive self-consciousness were not
related to either form of external distraction (ps  .24), suggesting
that the above correlations are specific to mind wandering rather
than a generally increased awareness of or tendency to report
cognitive failure.
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6 FORSTER AND LAVIE
The results of Experiment 3 provide a striking replication of
Experiment 1’s key finding that mind wandering is related to
interference from the task-irrelevant distractors but not from the
task-relevant response-competition distractors. As the two distrac-
tor types were equal in visual and semantic salience, as well as
novelty, it appears that irrelevance to the task is indeed a key factor
in determining the relationship with mind wandering. As in Ex-
periment 2, irrelevant distractor interference decreased as a func-
tion of time on task: Interference effects in Blocks 16 were
significantly greater than those in Blocks 712, t(39)  3.34,
SEM  15.82, p  .01; see Table 3 (although it is interesting
that no such reduction was found on the response-competition
effects, t  1).
The greater number of no-distractor trials in Experiment 3 also
allowed us to examine the relation between mind wandering and
individual differences in baseline (i.e., the no-distractor condition)
mean RT, RT variability (standard deviation), and error rate. No
relation was found between mind wandering scores and any of
these measures (all ps  .2). The lack of relation of mind wan-
dering scores to RT variability may appear inconsistent with
previous findings (McVay & Kane, 2009; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek,
2013) that increased reports of task-unrelated thoughts during
sustained attention or rhythm-keeping tasks are associated with
increased RT variation. However, although higher mind wandering
scores on the DFS questionnaire may be linked to a greater rate of
task-unrelated thought during our task, it is not clear how sensitive
this particular task is to revealing individual differences in task-
unrelated thoughts online, that is, during task performance. For
example, unlike a sustained attention task, the request to make
choice responses to cartoon categories and the presence of distrac-
tors on some of the task trials may have led the participants to be
more attentive and task engaged overall, reducing their tendency to
lapse into task-unrelated thought. Moreover, in contrast to the
continuous response methods used in previous studies on RT
variability, our task was likely to be less sensitive to show effects
on RT variability because of its discrete trial-by-trial nature that
allowed for a degree of self-pacing (because each trial was termi-
nated by the participant’s response and thus participants’ RT
determined the trial duration, a factor that may encourage a more
regular pacing).
General Discussion
The present study establishes for the first time a link between
the propensity for mind wandering and a behavioral measure of
susceptibility to external irrelevant distraction. In two experiments,
we have demonstrated a positive correlation between mind wan-
dering propensity and distraction by the presence of salient yet
task-unrelated distractor images. This finding is important in es-
tablishing mind wandering as a symptom of a more general sus-
ceptibility to irrelevant distraction. However, our findings also
highlight that not all forms of distractor interference are related:
Mind wandering is not related to interference from task-relevant
response-competition distractors. These findings have implications
both for the understanding of mind wandering and for the selective
attention study of distraction. We consider these implications in
the following sections.
Selective Attention and the Study of Distraction
Selective attention research has previously largely neglected
internal forms of distraction (although see Forster & Lavie, 2009,
for an exception). The present work allows us to extend selective
attention research to also accommodate distraction by internal
sources. Our results suggest that distraction from task-irrelevant
sources, both external and internal, may be driven by common
attentional mechanisms, which vary in efficiency between individ-
uals.
Task irrelevance appears to be a key factor in determining the
relationship between mind wandering and external distraction:
This is highlighted by the contrasting correlations with mind
wandering found for the two distractor measures in the present
study. Individuals prone to off-task mind wandering also appear
more likely to be distracted by task-irrelevant stimuli in the exter-
nal environment. On the one hand, they are no more likely to suffer
interference from stimuli that are relevant to the task, even when
these are highly salient and meaningful (Experiment 3). These
findings suggest that the interference produced by response-
competing distractors reflects, at least in part, a different mecha-
Figure 3. Mind wandering and irrelevant distractor interference in Ex-
periment 3. Mind wandering (score on the Daydreaming Frequency sub-
scale) correlated positively with mean irrelevant distractor cost (mean RT
for distractor trials  mean RT for no-distractor trials, in milliseconds).
RT  reaction time; D  distractor; ND  no distractor.
Table 3
Mean Reaction Time Distractor Costs (in Milliseconds) by
Distractor Measure and Time on Task in Experiment 3
Distractor measure Blocks 1–6 Blocks 7–12
Irrelevant distractor cost (SE) 131 (10) 78 (11)
Response-competition cost (SE) 98 (18) 94 (13)
Note. Irrelevant distractor cost  mean reaction time with the irrelevant
distractor  mean reaction time with no distractor; response-competition
cost  mean reaction time with an incongruent distractor  mean reaction
time with a congruent distractor.
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7MIND WANDERING AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DISTRACTION
nism from that underlying irrelevant distraction (whether from
external stimuli or mind wandering). It is, for example, possible
that although both sources of distraction reflect a failure to focus
attention, the distraction from sources that are entirely irrelevant
and unrelated to the task may reflect a different level of inability
to focus on the current task. On the other hand, distraction from
response-competition items may reflect a more specific type of
failure to control task performance in line with the current task
priorities (and thus a failure to consider target information with a
higher priority than potentially competing distractor information).
Further examination of this new dissociation between task-relevant
versus task-irrelevant distraction should be an important topic for
future investigations of individual differences in attention, as well
as for elucidating the shared mechanisms underlying both task-
irrelevant external distraction and mind wandering.
Implications for Mind Wandering
Given the well-established role of executive control in over-
coming external distraction (e.g., De Fockert, Rees, Frith, &
Lavie, 2001, 2004; Lavie, 2000; Lavie & De Fockert, 2006), our
suggestion of a common mechanism underlying both mind
wandering and task-irrelevant external distraction may be taken
to allude to executive control and thus initially appear consis-
tent with the view of mind wandering as reflecting a failure of
executive control (e.g., see McVay & Kane, 2010). Previous
evidence for this viewpoint has been drawn primarily from
studies demonstrating that individuals scoring highly on a be-
havioral index of working memory capacity (a classic executive
control function) reported reduced task-unrelated mind wander-
ing (e.g., Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009; although see
Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012, for a conflicting
finding). However, we note that the contrasting relationship
with response-competition interference (which is also thought
to depend on executive control processes; Botvinick et al.,
2001; Lavie et al., 2004) is inconsistent with the notion of mind
wandering being determined simply by differences in the ge-
neric efficiency of executive control. Indeed given the multi-
tude of executive control functions (e.g., Shallice & Burgess,
1996), it appears likely that the executive functions involved in
the propensity for both mind wandering and irrelevant distrac-
tion are different from those involved in the propensity for
interference in response-competition paradigms. The propensity
for task-unrelated thoughts and distraction may reflect a control
failure at a different level from that reflected in response-
competition, as we mentioned in the previous section.
Despite the correlation between individual differences in
mind wandering and task-irrelevant external distraction, Exper-
iment 2 did not reveal any online relationship between the two
forms of distraction during task performance. In fact, our time-
on-task analyses in Experiments 2 and 3 found contrasting
patterns for the effect of time-on-task on fluctuations in levels
of mind wandering versus external distraction. In this respect,
our findings remain consistent with previous suggestions that
mind wandering involves perceptual decoupling of executive
resources from external stimuli (see Schooler et al., 2011, for
review). Such suggestions have been supported by demonstra-
tions that periods of task-unrelated thought are associated with
reduced event-related potential (ERP) response to, as well as
reduced encoding or comprehension of, external task-relevant
stimuli. Taken together with these previous findings, our results
imply that highly distractible individuals are likely to experi-
ence such decoupling from external tasks with particularly high
frequency. However, it is important to note that our findings are
incompatible with the notion that habitual mind wanderers have
enhanced ability to insulate internal processing against all
forms of external disruption (cf. Smallwood et al., 2012), as this
would be expected to lead to reduced interference from the
task-irrelevant external distractors. To the contrary, even
though the individuals most prone to mind wandering may have
experienced more periods of decoupling from our task, they
were nevertheless more, rather than less, distracted by the
presentation of salient task-irrelevant external distractors.
Measuring Distraction in Daily Life
Our measure of distraction by salient yet task-irrelevant external
stimuli was designed to parallel a form of distraction that, like
distraction from task-unrelated thoughts, is common in daily life.
The positive relationship we established between these two com-
mon, yet quite different, sources of daily life distraction adds
validity to our measure as an index of general daily life distract-
ibility (regardless of whether the source is internal or external).
Indeed, our findings are consistent with a recent report of positive
correlations between questionnaire measures of mind wandering
and of selective attention failures in daily life (Carriere, Seli, &
Smilek, 2013). Our demonstration that mind wandering is associ-
ated with increased irrelevant distraction, as measured behavior-
ally rather than on the basis of self-report, allows us to further
substantiate this claim.
In contrast, it is more difficult to think of an example of daily
life distraction in which, as in the response-competition paradigm,
the distractor interference is contingent on the conflicting relation-
ship between the task-relevant distractor identity and the stimuli
involved in the task being performed. The present findings support
the view that our measure of task-irrelevant distraction may be a
more reliable paradigm for the investigation of general daily life
distraction than the frequently used response-competition para-
digm. Such a measure could be particularly useful in clinical
research, given that clinical diagnostic forms and checklists may
often refer to increased daily life distraction without clarifying
whether the source is internal or external (see Forster, Robertson,
Jennings, Asherson, & Lavie, in press). With future replications
and validation, our measure could also be developed into a pre-
dictive tool for identifying heightened vulnerability to mind wan-
dering without having to rely on subjective reports.
In summary, the present study integrates the previously separate
literatures of mind wandering and external distraction, demonstrat-
ing that both phenomena may be determined by common individ-
ual differences. These findings highlight that internal distraction
from mind wandering is a highly understudied category of task-
irrelevant distraction. To achieve a full understanding of the ubiq-
uitous and often disruptive daily life phenomenon of failure to
ignore irrelevant distractors, future researchers should include
consideration of both internal and external forms of distraction in
their studies.
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